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Assassinations are a persistent feature of the political landscape.  Using a new data set of assassination
attempts on all world leaders from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success or
failure of assassination attempts to identify assassination's effects. We find that, on average, successful
assassinations of autocrats produce sustained moves toward democracy. We also find that assassinations
affect the intensity of small-scale conflicts. The results document a contemporary source of institutional
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 “Assassination has never changed the history of the world.” 
- Benjamin Disraeli, 1865, on the death of Abraham Lincoln  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Assassinations of prominent political leaders have occurred throughout history.  From 
Julius Caesar to Abraham Lincoln, from John F. Kennedy to Yitzhak Rabin, many leaders have 
met violent ends – and many others have escaped assassination narrowly.  Had Hitler lingered 13 
minutes longer in a Munich beer hall in 1939, he would likely have been killed by a waiting 
bomb. Whether or not objectionable, or illegal,
1 assassination and assassination attempts are a 
persistent feature of the political landscape.  In fact, as we will show below, a national leader has 
been assassinated in nearly two of every three years since 1950. 
To understand assassination – as an influence in history, as a policy, even as a normative 
matter – it is important to understand whether assassinations actually change the course of 
events. On this topic there is considerable debate, primarily among historians who have focused 
on individual assassinations or small collections of case studies.
2  In this paper, we assess the 
impact of assassination using a data-driven approach.
3 Specifically, we focus on the assassination 
of national leaders and examine its effects on two important outcomes: institutional change and 
                                                 
1 Moral and legal debates over assassination stretch through history.  Dante condemned Brutus for the murder of 
Cesar, but Cicero and others have been more kind (Miola 1985).  An ethical basis for “tyrannicide” was 
promulgated by John of Salisbury in the 12
th century and further articulated by Milton in the late Renaissance (e.g. 
Nederman 1988).   In the United States, government-sponsored assassination was not formally outlawed until 1976, 
and here only by Executive Orders that are themselves the subject of renewed debate.  
2 For example, Hudson (2000) discusses a set of assassinations and argues that assassination has little effect, echoing 
Disraeli’s view.  However, the murder of Archduke Ferdinand is often described as the triggering event of World 
War I.  More recently, the murder of President Habyarimana may have unleashed the Rwandan genocide, and 
historians have argued that the Vietnam War was prolonged by the assassination of President Kennedy (Halberstam, 
1972, Jones, 2003).  
3 To the best of our knowledge, the only related paper along these lines is Zussman and Zussman (2006), who find 
evidence that assassinations of senior members of Palestinian organizations affect Israeli stock returns.   2
war.  The results show substantial effects of assassinations, informing our understanding of 
assassination and more broadly informing theories of institutional change and conflict. 
Analyzing the effects of assassination is difficult.  While some assassinations may be 
associated with historical turning points, the direction of causation is difficult to establish, 
especially since assassination attempts often occur (as we will show) in times of crisis, such as 
during war. To overcome this problem, we employ a large set of assassination attempts and use 
the “failures” as controls for the “successes”.  To focus on the cases where the success or failure 
of the attempt was most likely determined by chance, we consider only those attempts in which 
the weapon was actually used – the gun fired, the bomb exploded, etc. The identification 
assumption is that, although attempts on leaders’ lives may be driven by historical 
circumstances, conditional on trying to kill a leader the success or failure of the attempt can be 
treated as plausibly exogenous.  For example, Hitler’s early departure from the beer hall in 1939, 
which may have saved his life, came only because bad weather prevented him from flying back 
to Berlin, forcing him to leave early for a train. 
To implement this approach, we collected data on all publicly-reported assassination 
attempts for all national leaders since 1875.  This produced 298 assassination attempts, of which 
59 resulted in the leader’s death.  We show that, conditional on an attempt taking place, whether 
the attack succeeds or fails in killing the leader appears uncorrelated with observable economic 
and political features of the national environment, suggesting that our basic identification 
strategy may be plausible.  
We find that assassinations of autocrats produce substantial changes in the country’s 
institutions, while assassinations of democrats do not. In particular, transitions to democracy, as 
measured using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2004), are 13 percentage points more   3
likely following the assassination of an autocrat than following a failed attempt on an autocrat. 
Similarly, using data on leadership transitions from the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al., 2006), 
we find that the probability that subsequent leadership transitions occur through institutional 
means is 19 percentage points higher following the assassination of an autocrat than following 
the failed assassination of an autocrat. The effects on institutions extend over significant periods, 
with evidence that the impacts are sustained at least 10 years later. 
Looking at military conflict, the results show that assassinations affect conflict, but only 
in limited contexts. We examine two data sources: the Gleditsch-Correlates of War dataset 
(Sarkees, 2000; Gleditsch 2004) and the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002).  We find that successful assassination lead to an intensification of small-scale conflicts 
relative to failed assassination attempts.  For high-intensity conflicts, we find somewhat weaker 
evidence that successful assassinations may have the opposite effect, hastening the end of large-
scale conflicts already in progress.  These results suggest heterogeneous effects of assassinations 
that depend on conflict status. 
All of these results tell us about the difference in outcomes following success and 
following failure.  Our approach does not distinguish whether the effects are driven by successful 
assassination (e.g., killing an autocrat leads to more democracy), failed assassination (e.g., trying 
but failing to kill an autocrat leads to increased suppression), or both.  To tease these different 
forces apart, we provide further analysis at the end of the paper that uses propensity-score 
matching methods to estimate the separate effects of success and failure. While the resulting 
estimates are informative, they should be viewed as substantially more speculative than our main 
results, because the decomposition relies on comparisons between years with assassination 
attempts and years without such attempts, which are not randomly assigned.   4
Using this methodology, we find that most of the effects discussed above are driven by 
successful assassinations, rather than failures. However, 75% of all assassination attempts fail, 
and there is some evidence that failed attempts have modest effects in the opposite direction of 
successful assassinations.  In particular, failed attempts slightly reduce the likelihood of 
democratic change and may lead to reductions in existing, small-scale conflict. Since failures are 
much more likely than successes, the modest effects of failure and the (less likely but larger) 
effects of success tend to offset each other. Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective, assassination 
attempts produce instability in political institutions and the path of conflict – with the outcome 
dependent on success or failure – but at most modest directional shifts in democracy or war on 
average. 
The results in this paper not only help understand assassination per se, but also help 
inform our understanding of institutional change and war more generally. Much of the empirical 
literature on institutions has explored the deep historical antecedents for modern institutional 
forms (Moore, 1966; North 1990; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Glaeser 
and Shleifer 2002).  Meanwhile, “modernization theory”, which attempts to explain 
democratization through increased education or income of the nation at large (e.g. Lipset 1959, 
Huntington 1991), has not found clear empirical support (Acemoglu et al. 2005, Glaeser et al. 
2006).  Thus contemporary sources of democracy remain substantially in the error term of 
econometric studies.  In this paper, we identify a source of contemporary change in institutions 
that complements the existing literature and steps beyond the confines of distant history.  
The results here also emphasize the interplay between institutions and the role of 
individual leaders. In particular, the primary results for institutional change are found only in 
autocracies.  This finding is natural if autocrats are relatively unconstrained, with significant   5
authority to alter formal institutions and policies, as opposed to leaders in democracies whose 
actions may be limited through electoral recall and institutions such as independent legislatures 
and judiciaries (Schumpeter 1950; Downs 1957; Tsebelis 2002; Jones and Olken 2005).  Our 
results point to the individual autocrat as a cornerstone of institutions, which suggests 
mechanisms – through leader selection and leader change – that can lead to institutional change.  
This paper also speaks to the literature on war.  Many formal models and empirical 
investigations of war focus on the role of different regime types in explaining different 
propensities for war (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Mansfield and Snyder 2005). In some 
of these models, war arises due to a divergence between the leader’s incentives and those of the 
population at large, the likelihood of which depends on the regime type (e.g., Goemans 2000, 
Jackson and Morelli 2005, Baliga et al. 2007).  From this point of view, assassinations, by 
changing leaders, may naturally produce changes in conflict status.  Our research thus provides 
support for this theoretical approach, which emphasizes the role of leaders in determining the 
escalation and cessation of conflict. 
Finally, this paper speaks to the role of chance in history.  We provide a statistically 
driven test of the capacity for small elements of luck to change national political systems and 
other outcomes, an idea seen in some broad historical assessments (Merriman 1985, Boorstin 
1995, Ferguson 1999) that stand in contrast to Whiggish or Marxist historical interpretation.  In 
this sense, this paper shares some similarities with literatures that emphasize historical chance in 
the initial shaping of institutions, whether it is the disease environment (Acemoglu et al. 2001), 
wind patterns (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2006), or other features. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and 
descriptive statistics.  Section 3 describes the “hit or miss” methodology, presents the central   6
results regarding institutional change and military conflict, and considers a number of robustness 
checks.  Section 4 presents the propensity score results to separate out the effect of success from 
the effect of failure. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1.  Data 
The focus of this paper is on assassinations and assassination attempts directed at the 
national leader, where the “leader” is defined as the most powerful political figure in each 
country at each point in time – the head of state (usually under the title of President), the head of 
government (usually under the title of Prime Minister), or perhaps some third figure. To establish 
a baseline list of leaders, we use the Archigos dataset, v2.5 (Goemans et al., 2006), which 
identifies the primary leader for each country at each point in time from 1875 to 2004.  Archigos 
provides a data set of 2,440 leaders from 187 different countries. 
To collect the assassinations data, we consulted the archives of three major newspapers: 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal.  We used a large set of  
keyword searches (detailed in the Appendix) and placed several limitations on the returned 
results. First, we excluded coup d’etats – cases in which the murder or attempted murder of the 
leader was conducted by an individual or group in an attempt to seize power for themselves. 
Second, we excluded “uncovered plots” to assassinate leaders, limiting ourselves to cases in 
which the would-be assassins actually undertook the attempt. For the main specifications in the 
paper, we further restrict our attention to “serious attempts,” which we define as those cases in 
which the weapon (the gun, bomb, etc.) was actually discharged, as opposed to cases where the 
attempt was thwarted prior to the weapon being used.  As shown below, our results are broadly 
robust to different restrictions on the nature of failed attempts.     7
For each assassination or attempted assassination found, we recorded the date and 
location of the attack, the weapons used, and the result for the leader, as well as information 
when available on other casualties and whether the attack was carried about by a group or solo 
actor.  The data includes 298 assassination attempts, of which 251 are “serious attempts” and 59 
result in the leader’s death.  A list of the successful assassinations is presented in Table 1. 
To ensure that the data collection methodology captured all relevant assassinations, once 
the newspaper searches were complete we cross-referenced the assassinations found by the 
searches with all assassinations listed in da Graca (2000), Jones and Olken (2005), and the 
Archigos data.  This exercise showed that our keyword searches produced all relevant 
assassinations.
4,5  
2.2.  Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides basic summary statistics.  With regard to weapons, guns have been the 
most common instrument, used in 55% of attempts, and explosive devices the second most 
common, used in 31% of attempts.  Guns have kill rates of about 30%, while explosive devices 
are much less likely to kill the leader, with success in only 7% of cases where the device was 
actually engaged.  At the same time, explosive devices produce the greatest number of casualties 
among bystanders, with the mean number of dead and wounded six and eight times larger than 
                                                 
4 It is more difficult to conclusively assess our effectiveness in capturing assassination attempts; however, there are 
several reasons to believe that our method was effective.  First, we ran the keyword searches sequentially, first with 
the New York Times, which produced 263 attempts, then the Washington Post, which produced an additional 33 
attempts, and then the Wall Street Journal, which produced only 2 additional attempts.  The rapidly diminishing 
returns to further searches suggest that we are accurately capturing publicly-known assassination attempts.  Second, 
as we will show below, the number of attempts produced by these searches turns out to closely track the number of 
successful assassinations through time.  Third, we focus our results on “serious attempts”, where the attack was 
actually carried out.  These attempts are more likely to be reported and thus harder to miss. 
5 Goemans (personal correspondence) notes that two cases, Zia in Pakistan and Boris III in Bulgaria, could be 
construed as natural deaths whereas our searching algorithm classified them as assassinations. We have verified that 
our results are not meaningfully changed by dropping these two observations.   8
for gun attacks.  Explosive devices thus appear to be both a particularly violent and particularly 
ineffective tool.
6  
Table 2 further shows that the vast majority of assassination attempts occur in the 
leader’s home country, with only 4% occurring outside the national borders.  Attempts are 
slightly more likely to be carried out by solo assassins than by groups of assassins (59% to 41%).  
Both solo and group attacks show a similar propensity to kill the leader, although group attacks 
tend to be far bloodier for bystanders. 
Figure 1 shows how the frequency of assassination events has evolved with time, plotting 
the frequency of attempts and successful assassinations in each decade.   Panel A indicates that 
the annual rate of assassinations increased in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, decreased 
substantially during the 1940s (perhaps as a result of heightened security during World War II), 
and has been at relatively high levels since 1950.  Currently, the world witnesses the 
assassination of a national leader in one of every two years. Interestingly, the frequencies of 
attempts and successes closely track one another.  In fact, the conditional probability of killing a 
leader given a serious attempt is not trending, remaining at about 25% through time. 
Panel B of Figure 1 presents these frequency patterns again, but normalizes by the 
number of countries (and hence the number of national leaders) that exist in a given year.  The 
rate of attempts and successes now appear to fall after 1930, an effect driven by the increasing 
number of independent countries in the world.  This means that, although the annual rate of 
assassinations is currently at historically high levels, the probability that a given leader is killed 
in any given year has fallen over the 20
th Century.  At the peak in the 1910s, a given leader had a 
nearly 1% chance of being assassinated in a given year; today, the probability is below 0.3%. 
                                                 
6 Yet we also find (in results not reported) that explosive devices are used with increasing regularity through time.  
This may reflect the fact that bombs can be triggered remotely so that, although less effective as a weapon, bombs 
put assassin(s) at lower risk of being caught.   9
 
3.  Hit or Miss:  Identifying the Effect of Assassination 
3.1.  Empirical approach 
In this section we investigate the causative effect of assassination.  To identify this effect 
we employ the inherent randomness in whether an attack is successful or not.  For example, John 
F. Kennedy did not escape the bullet that killed him, even though it was fired from 265 feet away 
and the president was in a moving car (Warren et al., 1964).  But Idi Amin did survive an attack 
in 1976, when a thrown grenade bounced of his chest and killed several bystanders. 
In our main specifications we examine OLS regressions of the form: 
  ii i i y SUCCESS X β γε =+ +  (1) 
where i indexes a country-year in which there is an assassination attempt, yi is an outcome of 
interest (primarily institutional change or change in war status), SUCCESSi is a dummy equal to 
1 if a leader is killed in that country and year and 0 if the leader survives any attempts, and Xi is a 
vector of other regressors.  The key identifying assumption is that we can treat SUCCESS as 
exogenous conditional on observables.  Then  [ ] |, 0 SUCCESS X ε = E , and we can write the 
average treatment effect as 
  [ ] [ ] |1 , |0 , y SUCCESS X y SUCCESS X β == −= EE  (2) 
This expression makes clear that estimates of (1) identify the difference between 
successful assassinations and failed assassination attempts.  We thus answer the precise question:  
what is the effect of killing versus failing to kill the leader?   If hypothesis tests reject that β  is 
zero, then the outcome of the attempt matters, and more broadly, we can reject the idea that 
assassinations do not change the course of events.  Note, however, that we cannot tell whether 
the effect of assassinations we identify comes from the effects of killing the leader, failing to kill   10
the leader, or both. In Section 4 below, we use propensity-score matching methods to tease out 
whether β is driven primarily by successful or failed assassinations, but since assassination 
attempts are non-random, that analysis is necessarily more speculative than the analysis 
presented here.
7 We therefore focus first on the better-identified question of whether national 
outcomes differ depending on the success or failure of assassination attempts.  
3.2.  Is Success Exogenous Conditional on Attempts? 
The key identification assumption for the main analysis is that, conditional on a serious 
attempt taking place, the success of the attempt – i.e., where the bullet hits, where the target is 
standing when the bomb explodes, etc. – is uncorrelated with the error term in (1). To investigate 
this assumption, we first ask whether observable variables that might be related to the error term 
in (1) predict SUCCESS conditional on attempt.   
As discussed above, one variable that we know predicts success is the type of weapon 
used in the attack. In particular, attempts that use explosive devices are much less likely to lead 
to a leader’s death than attempts that use other weapons. For this reason, all specifications in the 
analysis below will include weapon fixed effects, although it turns out that the inclusion or 
exclusion of weapon fixed effects does not affect the results.  
To investigate whether other variables predict successful assassinations, we present in 
Panel A of Table 3 the mean values of a number of variables in the year prior to successful and 
failed assassination attempts, as well as the result from two-sided t-tests for the equality of these 
means.  The table shows that the sample of successful and failed assassination attempts is 
balanced across a wide variety of variables: a dummy for whether the country was democratic or 
not (defined using the POLITY2 variable from Polity IV) and recent changes therein, the status 
                                                 
7 As a preview, we find below that it is primarily the killing of leaders that appears to drive change, rather than 
failure.   11
of war and recent changes therein (from the Gleditsch-COW war data), the age of the leader, the 
tenure of the leader, and log per-capita energy consumption, which serves as a proxy measure for 
per-capita income.
8,9  The only result in Table 3 where the difference between successes and 
failures is statistically significant is the log of national population (p-value 0.05); however, given 
that we have examined 8 variables, it is natural that one be statistically significant at this level.  
In Panel B of Table 3, we present the results from Probit specifications that consider all 
of these variables simultaneously. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
  () ( ) 12 ' aa PS U C C E S S X γ γ =Φ +  (3) 
where a is a serious assassination attempt and X are the same variables considered in Panel A. 
We present specifications with and without weapon fixed effects, and also with and without 
fixed effects for the region of the world where the attack takes place. When considering all of the 
variables in Table 3 jointly, their joint p-value ranges from 0.40 to 0.49, depending on which 
fixed effects are included.
10 In the robustness analysis below (see Section 3.4), we show that the 
inclusion or exclusion of all of these variables as controls has little effect on the results. 
Combined, the relative lack of predictability of SUCCESS, and the invariance of the results to 
adding controls for SUCCESS, suggests that the identification assumption is plausible.  
3.3.  Main results 
In this section we present our main results. To test hypotheses, we consider both 
parametric and non-parametric specifications. First, we estimate (1) using OLS with robust 
                                                 
8 Recent changes in political institutions and war status compare values in the year prior to the attempt to values 
three years prior to the attempt.   These are lagged versions of the dependent variables used below, which compare 
institutional or conflict status one year after the attempt with status one year before.  
9 The energy consumption measure comes from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset version 
3.02 (Singer et al. 1972, 1987). We use such a proxy measure because data on per-capita income is not available for 
the world sample prior to 1950. 
10 If we use the linear POLITY2 variable instead of the democracy dummy, the joint p-values range from 0.09 to 
0.31, with the linear variable significant in some specifications. The results in the paper are also robust to including 
this linear POLITY2 variable as a control instead of the dummy version.    12
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level. Adjusting for clustering at the 
country level helps account for potential serial correlation of the error term in the event that there 
are multiple attempts in the same country. In the OLS specifications, we include fixed effects for 
the weapon used to take into account the differential success probabilities of different weapons, 
as discussed above. We also include fixed effects for the number of attempts in a given country-
year.  We do this because, even if the success or failure of a given attempt is exogenous, as the 
evidence above suggests, the likelihood of success on an annual basis is increasing in the number 
of attempts, so that the probability of success in a given year is only exogenous if we condition 
on the number of attempts that took place.
11 
Second, we report the results of non-parametric tests.  For cases where the dependent 
variable takes a small number of potential outcomes, we report the results of the Fisher exact test 
(Fisher 1935; Pagano and Halvorsen, 1981), which has exact small sample properties.  This test 
takes the marginal distribution of each variable as given and calculates the probability that the 
actual association found, or a tighter association, could be produced by chance.  This test is exact 
because it calculates the exact probability of each permutation of the variables, which is a finite 
set.
12  For variables that take a large number of values, we calculate non-parametric p-values 
from the Wilcoxon (1945) rank-sum test. In this test, the outcomes from successful and failed 
assassinations are pooled and jointly ranked. The test-statistic is the sum of the ranks for the 
successes. Wilcoxon shows that the sum of the ranks is normally distributed, and gives formulas 
                                                 
11 In any case, the inclusion or exclusion of weapon fixed effects or number-of-attempt fixed effects has no material 
effect on the results. 
12 For example, if success occurs in 59 of 251 cases and an outcome variable changes in, say, 25 of 251 cases, one 
can calculate the probability for each possible permutation of these two variables in a 2x2 matrix (e.g. the 
probability that 22 of the successes correspond to 12 of the outcome changes).  By considering every possible 
permutation of success and the outcome, one can calculate the cumulative probability that the actual association 
witnessed, or some even tighter association, was produced purely by chance.  This is the reported P-value.   13
for the mean and variance of the sum of the ranks under the null hypothesis that the two samples 
are drawn from identical distributions.  
3.3.1.  Political Institutions 
To investigate the effect of assassination on political institutions, we consider two 
measures of institutions.  The first measure is a dummy variable for political institutions, where 1 
indicates democracy and 0 indicates autocracy.  This variable is a binary version of the 
POLITY2 variable from the Polity IV dataset.
13,14 The second measure, which is derived 
independently from the Archigos data set, records the percentage of leader transitions over the 
following twenty years (excluding the leader in power at the time of the attempt) that are 
“regular” – i.e. proceed lawfully -- as opposed to irregular transitions such as coups.
15  
Table 4 presents the main results, comparing changes in the democracy measures from 
the year before the assassination attempt to the year after.  In column (1) we examine whether 
there are changes in institutions (in one direction or another) following assassinations. The 
dependent variable in column (1) takes the value 1 if the regime switched democracy/autocracy 
status and 0 otherwise. We see that changes between regimes are 9 percentage points more likely 
when the leader is killed than when the leader survives the attack.  These results are statistically 
                                                 
13 Specifically, we define autocracy as cases where the POLITY2 variable is less than or equal to zero and 
democracy as cases where the POLITY2 variable is greater than zero.  The POLITY2 variable itself has 20 
categories, 10 for autocracy and 10 for democracy, but the meaning of finer distinctions in this index are less clear, 
especially since the POLITY2 index is not coded according to obvious objective criteria.  For this reason, we focus 
on the clearer binary distinction of this measure for our main results.  In results not reported, we find broadly similar 
results when using changes in the linear index as the outcome measure. 
14 We have also considered other measures in the Polity IV data (in results not reported but available from the 
authors).  These include the variable XCONST, which measures the degree of executive constraints on the leader, 
POLCOMP, which measures political competition – the extent to which alternative political preferences can be both 
expressed and pursued, and the linear POLITY2 measure.  POLCOMP is intended to refer to aspects of the political 
regime other than the power of the executive (which is captured by XCONST).  We find that these measures 
produce broadly similar results to those presented in the tables. 
15 Archigos defines a regular leader transition as one that occurs according to explicit rules or established 
conventions. Following Archigos, we exclude cases in which leader transitions occurred following deaths in office 
due to natural causes or accidents, though including them as either ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’ does not substantively 
change the results. Calculating the percentage of regular transitions over all transitions 1-20 years after the attempt 
(as opposed to excluding the target of the attempt) produces stronger results than those reported in the table.    14
significant using both the parametric and non-parametric hypothesis tests. In column (2) we 
consider whether assassinations lead systematically in the direction of democracy or autocracy. 
Here, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if a regime switched from autocracy to 
democracy, -1 if the regime switched from democracy to autocracy, and 0 if no change occurred.  
The results show that, on average, successful assassinations lead toward democracy. This result 
is not quite statistically significant with the parametric test and significant with a p-value of 0.02 
with the non-parametric test.  Lastly, column (3) shows that successful assassinations raise the 
probability that future leader transitions occur lawfully by 11 percentage points.  This last 
measure operates on an objective criterion, leadership transition, from a source entirely 
independent of the Polity IV data, and thus helps validate the Polity IV results.
16  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the effect of assassination conditional on the initial nature of 
the regime.  Importantly, we find that the effects are limited to autocracies.  The successful 
assassination of an autocrat creates a highly significant 13 percentage point increase in the 
probability of democratic transition, compared to the case where the assassination attempt failed.  
Meanwhile, the successful assassination of democrats produces no change in institutions using 
the Polity IV measure.  Democratic institutions thus appear robust to the assassination of leaders, 
while autocratic regimes are not. Similar results are obtained using the percentage of regular 
future leadership transitions from Archigos as the criterion – successful assassination of autocrats 
creates a 19 percentage point increase in the probability that future leadership transitions occur 
by regular means, whereas there is no change in the probability that future leadership transitions 
occur by regular means following a successful assassination of a democrat. 
                                                 
16 One potential critique of the Polity IV measures is that the Polity analysts may have used changes in leadership to 
demarcate underlying changes in institutions. This concern, however, does not apply to the percent of regular 
transitions variable from Archigos. The fact that we obtain similar results using the percent of regular transitions 
variable suggests that coding decisions are not driving the results.   15
Table 5 breaks down these effects by the tenure of the leader at the time of the attempt 
and by the duration of the effect. Each cell reports the coefficient on SUCCESS from a separate 
regression, where the sample is shown in the column and the duration of the change used to 
calculate the dependent variable is shown in the row. The top panel indicates that the short-run 
move to democracy is particularly large following the assassination of long-tenured autocrats, for 
whom a successful assassination increases the probability of democratic transition in the next 
year by 20 percentage points relative to a failed assassination.  The distinction between tenure is 
less clear with time however.  The most interesting result in this table appears in Panel A column 
(4), which shows that democratic transitions following assassinations of autocrats appear to be 
sustained 10 years later.  The point estimate suggests that initially autocratic regimes are 19 
percentage points more likely to be democracies 10 years after the attempt if the assassination 
succeeded rather than failed.  Twenty years into the future, however, the results are substantially 
attenuated using the binary Polity IV measure. 
Panel B of Table 5 considers the probability that future leader transitions are regular. Of 
particular note is the last row, where we limit ourselves to leadership transitions that occur 
between 11 and 20 years after the assassination attempt. These results show that, following a 
successful assassination of an autocrat, leadership transitions 11 to 20 years after the attempt are 
21 percentage points more likely to be regular. Following a successful assassination of a long-
tenured autocrat, leadership transitions 11 to 20 years after the attempt are 42 percentage points 
more likely to be regular, though this result is only statistically significant in the non-parametric 
specification. Combined, these results suggest that assassinations have substantial and at least 
somewhat prolonged effects on institutions.  
   16
3.2.2. War 
To investigate the effect of assassinations on war, we use two datasets on conflict: the 
Gleditsch (2004) revision of the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees 2000), and the PRIO/Uppsala 
Armed Conflict dataset, version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, PRIO 2006). The Gleditsch-COW 
dataset contains data on all armed conflicts with over 1000 battle deaths from 1816-2002, and to 
the best of our knowledge is the only dataset with worldwide coverage on conflicts for the entire 
time period we consider. The data indicates whether a war exists for a given nation in a given 
year and, if a war exists, the type of war (civil, interstate, et cetera). The PRIO dataset contains 
more information – it contains data on all armed conflicts with over 25 battle deaths per year and 
further describes conflict intensity, indicating whether a conflict had 25-999 battle deaths or 
1000 plus battle deaths in a given year.
17 The coverage of the PRIO dataset, however, only 
begins in 1946, which is why we examine both datasets.
18  
Table 6 examines the effect of assassination on war status.  The dependent variable is the 
difference in war status of a country one year after assassination attempts compared to one year 
before.
19 The first column presents the results for the full sample, using all attempts from 1875-
2002 and the Gleditsch-COW data. The second column presents the results again but restricting 
the Gleditsch-COW data to the postwar period (1946-2002), and the final column presents the 
results using the PRIO data for the same sample (1946-2002). Panel A presents the average 
effect of successful assassination relative to failed attempts, and Panel B splits the sample by war 
status in the year prior to the attempt. 
                                                 
17 We define the PRIO variable to be 0.5 if a small conflict is taking place, 1 if a large conflict is taking place, and 0 
otherwise. 
18 Although in theory Gleditsch-COW and PRIO should agree on conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths, Gleditsch 
(2004) notes that they do not. Although he makes some changes to the COW data to clarify the coding, the two 
datasets are still not identical. 
19 We group all types of war, which are mainly interstate wars or civil wars.  In results not reported, we analyze civil 
wars separately and find no substantial difference in the results.   17
Looking at Table 6, we see three primary results.  First, there is weak evidence that 
successful assassination attempts, compared to failed assassination attempts, tend to hasten the 
end of intense wars (i.e. wars with greater than 1000 battle deaths).  This effect appears in Panel 
B, column (1), and suggests that successful assassination lowers the probability of continued, 
intense conflict by 25 percentage points.  Although the effect is quite large in magnitude, it is 
only marginally significant (P-value of .08 parametrically and .13 non-parametrically) and is not 
significant when we restrict to the post World War II period.  The post-war results are difficult to 
interpret, however, because there are few observations of intense wars after 1946.  Overall we 
conclude that there is some evidence, but only weak evidence, for an effect on intense wars. 
Second, there is evidence that successful assassination attempts, compared to failed 
attempts, lead to increased intensity of existing moderate-level conflicts.  This is seen in Panel B, 
column (3), where we see a 33 percentage point increased probability that a war intensifies when 
the leader is killed.  This large point estimate shows some significance (P-value of .05 
parametrically and .13 non-parametrically) even though the sample size is substantially smaller 
due to the fact that the PRIO data exists only for the post-1945 era. 
Third, we find that the outcomes of assassination attempts appear irrelevant to the start of 
new wars. This is seen in Panel B, across both datasets we examine. For example, taken literally 
this suggests that World War I might have begun regardless of whether or not the attempt on the 
life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 had succeeded or failed.
20 
In sum, these results suggest heterogeneity in the effect of assassination, depending on 
the level of conflict at the time of the attempt. The success or failure of an assassination does not 
matter for the start of conflicts, as least as we can measure them in our data. However, successful 
                                                 
20 Note, however, that this event itself is not in our data, as Archduke Ferdinand was the crown prince of Austria-
Hungary, rather than the leader.   18
assassinations, compared to failed assassinations, appear to intensify moderate-level conflicts but 
hasten the end of high-intensity conflicts.  These are somewhat subtle results, suggesting an 
important role of assassination for conflict, but with effects depending on the circumstances.  We 
will consider further interpretation of the conflict results in Section 4 below. 
 
3.4.   Robustness Checks and Additional Specifications 
Our main results feature both parametric and non-parametric tests, and thus confront 
alternative specifications of the error process.  In this section we further consider a number of 
robustness checks based on alternative specifications of assassination events and the inclusion of 
observable variables. 
Table 7 reconsiders the main results for institutional change.  For comparison, the top 
panel summarizes the baseline results from Table 4, where we compared successful 
assassinations against failed ‘serious attempts’, defined as those attempts in which the weapon 
was actually used in the attempt to kill the leader. The next four panels consider different ways 
of defining the comparison group of failed assassination attempts.   We see that further limiting 
the set of serious attempts to cases where there were casualties – i.e. where the target or a 
bystander sustained wounds – produces similar results as the main specification.  Further limiting 
the control group to cases where the leader specifically was wounded (but not killed) reduces the 
set of failed attempts by 70%, leaving only 40 failures.  When we focus on this more limited 
sample, the results tend to lose some significance, though some results remain statistically 
significant and overall the point estimates do not change substantially. The next panel uses the 
full set of attempts, as opposed to serious attempts, and produces similar results as the main 
specification.  Finally, we try limiting the observations to (a) attempts by solo attackers, and (b)   19
the first attempt on a given leader.  While these restrictions cut the sample size down, so that the 
standard errors increase, most point estimates change only modestly.  
The last panel of Table 7 tries a somewhat different specification.  We return to the 
baseline specification but add as controls all of the variables in Table 3, as well as time (quarter-
century) and region fixed effects.  Including of the full set of controls reduces the sample size, 
but the results are similar to the baseline, with typically somewhat larger coefficients and 
somewhat larger standard errors.
21  
In results not reported in the table (but available from the authors on request), we have 
also conducted the same set of robustness checks on the war results. As with the results on 
institutional change, we find that the war results are essentially similar to the results in the main 
specifications if we consider alternate control groups (bystanders wounded, target wounded, or 
all attempts), consider only solo attempts or first attempts, or add the full set of controls. 
 
4.  Distinguishing Between Success and Failure 
The results thus far suggest that assassinations have important effects.  These effects are 
identified using inherent randomness in whether an attack is successful, showing significant 
differences in outcomes comparing successes and failures.  It may be natural to presume that the 
“successes” – where the leader dies – are more important drivers of change than the “failures”, 
since success automatically produces changes in leadership while failure does not.  However, it 
is also possible that failed attempts change outcomes; for example, an autocrat who survives an 
                                                 
21 In a different style of analysis, we have also considered whether natural or accidental leader deaths produce 
institutional change. We find that natural and accidental deaths of autocrats increase the probability of a change in 
institutions, but these changes are much smaller in magnitude and limited to extreme autocrats.  
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assassination attempt may impose crackdowns on opposition groups, leading a country further 
from democracy.   
In this section we consider the separate effects of success and failure.  Identifying these 
effects separately is necessarily more speculative than identifying the difference between them.  
The challenge is that, while the path of a bullet may be driven largely by chance, attempts 
themselves do not occur at random. As a result, the absolute effects of successes and the absolute 
effect of failures may be conflated with changes that would have occurred anyway, and which 
are correlated with the probability that an attempt took place. For example, if attempts on 
autocrats are more likely in autocracies that are in the process of liberalizing, one might 
erroneously attribute a subsequent democratization that would have happened anyway to the 
effect of a successful or failed assassination.  
That said, one can make some headway on this issue by employing a propensity-score 
matching approach.  We use observable features of the national context to predict when 
assassination attempts will occur and then stratify the sample according to these features. We are 
therefore making comparisons between years with assassination events and years without such 
events within comparable contexts. While this approach is not perfect, and does not solve the 
problem if assassination attempts are correlated with unobservable variables that also predict 
subsequent outcomes, it does provide a flexible approach to dealing with selection on 
observables. 
To implement this approach, for all countries c and years t, we first estimate equations of 
the form 
  ( ) ( ) ' ct ct P ATTEMPT X ρ =Φ  (4)   21
which allow us to predict attempts conditional on observables. Based on the predicted 
probabilities from (4), we form 6 blocks, denoted by b, for different levels of the propensity 
score, and check that the covariates are all balanced between treatments and controls within each 
block. We then estimate regressions of the form 
  ' ib b s ib f ib ib ib y SUCCESS FAILURE X α ββ γ ε =+ + + + (5) 
where αb indicates fixed effects for each propensity score block.  
4.1.  Predicting Assassination Attempts 
We start by considering whether assassination attempts are predictable and find that they 
are – and in interesting ways.  Table 8 shows the results of estimating (4).  The annual rate of 
assassination attempts is 0.7 percentage points higher in autocracies than in democracies.  The 
baseline probability of an attempt in a given country-year is 2.4%, so this implies that autocrats 
are approximately 30% more likely to be the target of attacks in a given year.  Attacks are also 
2.8 percentage points more likely during wartime - more than doubling the background 
probability – which makes war a particularly powerful predictor of assassination attempts.   
Interestingly, these results are consistent with the results in Section 3, which showed that 
assassinations of autocrats had an impact on institutional change, and that assassinations had an 
impact on wars that were in progress. The results here suggest that potential assassins may 
understand that assassinations against autocrats or wartime leaders are more likely to have an 
effect, and hence are more likely to attempt to kill precisely those leaders where it would make a 
difference.
22 
                                                 
22 These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Feierabend et al. (1971) and Iqbal and Zorn (2003). 
Feierabend et al. consider the correlates of assassination attempts from 1948-1967, and, consistent with our findings, 
find that assassination attempts are more common in poorer countries, more autocratic (or, in their terminology, 
more coercive) countries, and in countries involved in war. Iqbal and Zorn consider predictors of successful 
assassinations since World War II and find, as we do, that political institutions and war predict assassination.  Both   22
Another interesting result that emerges in Table 8 is that attempts are more common in 
countries with larger populations; doubling the population increases the probability of an 
assassination attempt each year by 0.35 percentage points. Though this may seem like a small 
effect, this implies that the leader of a country the size of the United States (population 300 
million) is 1.8 percentage points, or about 75 percent, more likely to be assassinated each year 
than the leader of a country the size of Switzerland (population 7.5 million).  This population 
effect is sustained in a multivariate context, so that it does not appear to proxy for per-capita 
income, institutions, or war status. One natural interpretation is that the number of would-be 
assassins rises with a country’s population, whereas there is only one leader in each country. The 
ratio of would-be assassins to leaders, and hence the probability of an attempt, therefore 
increases with population. The results in Table 8 also indicate that assassination attempts are 
somewhat less likely in richer countries, as measured by energy intensity. Note that, in results 
not reported in the table, both the population and the energy intensity results are unchanged when 
we include decade fixed effects, so that these results are not being driven by growth in 
population or income over time. 
4.2.  The Roles of Success and Failure 
Given these predictors of assassination attempts, Table 9 presents separate estimates for 
the effects of success and failure, relative to comparable years in which there was no 
assassination attempt, using equation (5).  For each dependent variable, we present three 
specifications.  In the first column, we present the regression with no controls.  In the second 
column, we include all of the controls in Table 8, which we have seen have substantial predictive 
power for assassination attempts.  In the third column, we include these controls again but 
                                                                                                                                                             
studies are limited to the question of predicting assassinations, rather than assessing the consequences of 
assassination.   23
further stratify the sample using propensity score matching.
23 As is evident in the table, adding 
the controls and the propensity score matching has a negligible effect on the estimates. 
We find several interesting results. Keeping in mind the caveats about identification in 
this section discussed above, we see that most of the effects identified in Section 3 appear to be 
driven by successful assassinations, though there are some cases in which failures may have 
effects.  The first three columns on Table 9 investigate the absolute value of changes in the 
POLITY2 dummy.  The results here suggest that it is successful assassinations that are driving 
the results.  Similar insight is provided by the second set of columns, which consider moves 
toward democracy.  Examining autocrats, successful assassination increases the probability of 
democratic transition in the next year by 13 percentage points compared to years without 
assassination events, while failed assassinations suggest a modest and statistically insignificant 1 
percentage point fall in the probability of democratic transition.  The effects of failure are 
amplified when we consider the percentage of “regular” leader changes in the ensuing 20 years, 
where successful assassinations of autocrats are associated with 16-21 percentage point increases 
in the percentage of regular future leader transitions while failure is associated with 6-7 
percentage point declines in the percentage of such leader transitions. If these estimates of failure 
actually represent the true causal effect of a failed assassination (as opposed, perhaps, to 
selection effects not controlled for perfectly with the propensity score methodology), then this 
would suggest that autocrats may slightly tighten their grip on power after failed assassination 
attempts.   
In sum, the institutional changes identified in Section 3 appear to decompose into (a) 
substantial roles for success and (b) smaller, and typically statistically insignificant, roles for 
                                                 
23In results not reported in the table, we find that alternate methods of propensity score estimation, such as kernel 
density matching and nearest-neighbor matching, produce qualitatively similar results in almost all cases.   24
failure. The results are quite consistent across specifications, so that controlling for observables 
and propensity score matching do not appear critical to the results. This suggests that, to the 
extent that the observable variables used in the propensity score form an important part of the 
selection of when attempts take place, these selection effects are not driving the results. Of 
course, it is impossible to know whether the effects of failures we pick up are driven by selection 
on unobservables, but the fact that controlling flexibly for the observable predictors of attempts 
makes no substantive difference provides at least suggestive evidence that the estimates are, in 
fact, identifying the effect of failures rather than a pure selection effect. 
Given that only 25% of assassination attempts are successful, if we take the point 
estimates in Table 9 literally, they imply that the average effect of assassination attempts on 
democracy is only modestly positive ex-ante, if positive at all.  Overall, the results imply that one 
would expect a 6-7 percentage point move toward democracy if the assassination succeeds 
(approximately 25% of the time), and a 2 percentage point move towards autocracy with failure 
(approximately 75% of the time), suggesting an approximately zero net effect on average.  
Focusing on autocrats, meanwhile, suggests a modest, positive move to democracy in 
expectation, with the point estimates implying a 3% ex-ante increased probability of 
democratization from assassination using the POLITY2 measure and essentially no mean shift 
ex-ante using the Archigos measure of future leader transitions – far smaller than the 15-20% 
average move to democracy comparing success with failure.  Thus, a policy of assassination 
attempts creates risk – it increases the probability that there will be a change in a country’s 
institutions – but if the probability of an attempt succeeding is 25%, there are at most modest 
gains in democracy on average.   25
The results on war, presented in Table 10, are similar to the results for institutional 
change in that they decompose into (a) substantial roles for success and (b) smaller roles for 
failure.  Focusing on Panel B, where we split by war status, columns (1)-(3) indicate that if a 
country is already involved in a serious conflict, a successful assassination can hasten the end of 
that conflict, with failed assassination attempts having little effect.  Specifically, the coefficients 
on success – suggesting a 25 percentage point fall in the probability that the war continues – are 
similar to what we found in Table 6 and are now significant at the 95% level.  Meanwhile, failure 
to kill the leader during an intense war has no apparent effect on the conflict.   As with Table 6 
however, these effects are substantially weaker in columns (4)-(9) where we consider post-1946 
data.  As noted above, there are few relevant observations of intense conflicts in this later period, 
so decisive interpretation of the post-war difference is difficult. 
Second, focusing on moderate-level conflicts, in Panel B columns (7)-(9), we see that 
most of the intensification effect found in Table 6 is driven by successful assassinations, 
although failed assassinations do suggest a decline conflict intensity.  Taken literally, this latter 
result might suggest that failed assassination attempts scare leaders enough to lead to a cessation 
of conflict. Given the opposing effects of success and failure, and the greater propensity for 
failed attempts in the data, these results share a similarity with the results for institutional 
change:  assassination attempts increase the variance of outcomes, but produce approximately 
neutral effects on moderate-level conflicts on average.   
Looking at cases where the country is not at war, the results – using both data sets – 
suggest that both successes and failures lead to an increase in conflict. Taken literally, this 
suggests that the act of an assassination attempt provokes conflict, regardless of the attempt’s 
success. However, it is also possible that this result reflects the inability of the propensity score   26
matching techniques to adequately predict assassination attempts in the context of incipient war, 
particularly if we view the assassination attempt as the opening shot of war.
24  
Overall, the war results make clear that the outcomes of assassinations can affect the 
outcomes of wars in progress, and that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the nature of 
these effects.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of assassination on the evolution of political institutions 
and military conflict.  Using a novel data set of assassinations and assassination attempts against 
national political leaders from 1875 to 2004, we employ inherent randomness in the success and 
failure of assassination attempt to identify whether these events affect national outcomes.  We 
find that the successful assassination of autocrats produces institutional change - substantially 
raising the probability that a country transitions to democracy.  This democratization effect is 
sustained ten years later.  The results for war are less systematic, with some evidence that 
assassination can exacerbate moderate-level conflict but hasten the end of intense conflict.  There 
is little evidence that the outcome of assassination attempts matters for the instigation of new 
wars. 
In sum, these results show that assassinations affect political institutions and conflict.  
Whether or not assassinations change “the history of the world” in Disraeli’s words, they do 
appear to change the history of individual countries.  Our tests provide evidence that small 
elements of randomness - the path of a bullet, the timing of an explosion, small shifts in a 
leader’s schedule - can result in substantial changes in national outcomes. The findings lend 
support to theoretical models of conflict that feature leadership and further suggest that 
                                                 
24 For example, on the eve of the current Iraq war the US government actively sought to kill Saddam Hussein 
through targeted bombing.   27
individual autocrats appear to be cornerstones of national institutions, complementing the 
literature on institutional origins by showing an important component of institutional change that 
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Data collection 
This appendix describes the method for collecting the assassinations data.  For detailed 
information about the Archigos, Polity IV, or Correlates of War datasets, and their construction, 
please see the resources listed in the references. 
To find assassinations and assassination attempts, we used the list of primary national 
leaders from 1875 to 2004 provided by Archigos and ran extensive keyword searches on the 
archives of major newspapers.  The searches examined whether words for assassination type 
events appeared in close proximity with particular leader and country identifiers.  The keywords 
used to capture the events were: 
•  EVENT: {assassination, assassin, assassinated, wound, wounded, injure, injured, kill, 
killed, attack, attacked, attempt, attempted, bomb, bombed, murder, murdered, shot, 
shoot, stab, stabbed, assault, assaulted, escape, escaped, die, dies, died, perish, 
perishes, perished, slain} 
while the country and leader identifiers were country specific.  For example, for Afghanistan we 
used: 
•  LEADER: {emir, king, president, prime minister, premier, amir, leader, ruler} 
•  COUNTRY: {Afghanistan, Afghan} 
Specific country and title names were taken from da Graca (2000), with the keywords 
“leader” and “ruler” used in all searches.  For some countries, where the generic LEADER 
keywords returned over 300 articles, we used the names of specific leaders in place of generic 
titles. 
The search results (returned articles) were then examined to determine whether an 
assassination attempt or assassination had occurred.  Information was then collected about the (a) 
date of the event, (b) outcome for the leader, (c) weapon(s) used, (d) location of the attack, (e) 
extent of other casualties, and also about (f) whether a solo assassin or group were responsible 
for the attack. 
The searches were first run exclusively on archives of the New York Times and then 
sequentially on archives of the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal.  For each country, 
different research assistants conducted the searches on each newspaper.  Distinctions between 
assassinations and coup d’etats were determined as necessary through the newspaper articles and 
through historical resources, primarily Lentz (1988, 1994, 1999, 2002).  Summary statistics are 
presented in Table 2.  The codebook and detailed data are available from the authors. 
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Table 1: Assassinations of Primary National Leaders Since 1875 
      
Country of Leader 
Year of 
Assassination  Name of Leader  Weapon Used 
Afghanistan 1919  Habibullah  gun 
Afghanistan 1933  Nadir  Shah  gun 
Algeria 1992  Boudiaf  gun 
Austria 1934  Dollfuss  gun 
Bulgaria 1943  Boris  III  gun 
Burundi 1994  Ntaryamira  other 
Congo (Brazzaville)  1977  Ngouabi  gun 
Congo (Kinshasa)  2001  Kabila  gun 
Dominican Republic  1899  Heureaux  gun 
Dominican Republic  1911  Caceres  gun 
Dominican Republic  1961  Trujillo  gun 
Ecuador 1875  Moreno  other 
Egypt 1981  Sadat  gun 
Greece 1913  George  I  gun 
Guatemala 1898  Reina  Barrios  unknown 
Guatemala 1957  Castillo  Armas  gun 
Haiti 1912  Leconte  explosive  device 
India 1984  Indira  Gandhi  gun 
Iran 1896  Nasir  Ad-Din  gun 
Ireland 1922  Collins  gun 
Israel 1995  Rabin  gun 
Japan 1921  Hara  knife 
Japan 1932  Inukai  gun 
Jordan 1951  Abdullah  gun 
Korea 1979  Park  gun 
Lebanon 1989  Moawad  explosive  device 
Madagascar 1975  Ratsimandrava  unknown 
Mexico 1920  Carranza  unknown 
Nepal 2001  Birendra  gun 
Nicaragua 1956  Somoza  gun 
Pakistan 1951  Khan  gun 
Pakistan 1988  Zia  other 
Panama 1955  Remon  gun 
Paraguay 1877  Gill unknown 
Peru 1933  Sanchez  Cerro  gun 
Poland 1922  Narutowicz  gun 
Portugal 1908  Carlos  I  gun 
Portugal 1918  Paes  gun 
Russia  1881  Alexander II  explosive device 
Rwanda 1994  Habyarimana  other 
Salvador 1913  Araujo  gun 
Saudi Arabia  1975  Faisal  gun 
Somalia 1969  Shermarke  gun 
South Africa  1966  Verwoerd  knife 
Spain 1897  Canovas  gun 
Spain 1912  Canalejas  gun 
Spain 1921  Dato  gun 
Sri Lanka  1959  Bandaranaike  gun 
Sri Lanka  1993  Premadasa  explosive device 
Sweden 1986  Palme  gun 
Togo 1963  Olympio  gun 
United States  1881  Garfield  gun 
United States  1901  McKinley  gun 
United States  1963  Kennedy  gun 
Uruguay 1897  Idiarte  Borda  gun 
Venezuela 1950  Delgado  gun 
North Yemen  1977  Al-Hamdi  gun 
North Yemen  1978  Al-Ghashmi explosive  device 
Yugoslavia 1934  Alexander  gun 
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Table 2: Assassination Attempts:  Summary Statistics 
         
      Probability Leader Killed  Bystander Casualties 









Type of Weapon            
Gun  161 55%  28%  31%  1.0  2.2 
Explosive device  91 31%  5%  7%  5.8  18.2 
Knife  23 8%  13%  21%  0.3  0.4 
Other  19 6%  16%  18%  1.1  0.3 
Unknown  10 3%  40%  44%  2.0  1.3 
            
Location            
Abroad  12 4%  25%  30%  3.6  6.5 
At home  286 96%  20%  23%  2.4  6.7 
            
Number of Attackers            
Solo  132 59%  24%  29%  0.4  2.5 
Group  92 41%  22%  26%  5.6  11.0 
            
Total Attempts  298 n/a  20%  24%  2.4  6.7 
 
Notes:  There are 298 total assassination attempts observed and 251 serious attempts.  Serious attempts are defined as cases where the 
weapon was actually used.  Note that the location of the attack is observed in every case, but the type of weapon is observed in 288 
cases and the number of attackers observed in 224 cases.  For some attempts, multiple types of weapons were used, so that the weapon 
observation counts sum to 304.  Attacks with weapons classified as “other” include arson, rocket attacks, stoning, and automobile 
crashes, among others. Also note that casualties among bystanders are skewed distributions so that the means are much larger than 
medians. 
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Table 3: Are successful and failed attempts similar? 
Panel A: Pairwise t-tests of sample balance.  
Variable Success  Failure  Difference  Pval  on  Difference 
Democracy  dummy  0.362 0.344 0.018  0.80 
  (0.064) (0.035) (0.072)   
Change in democracy   -0.036  -0.022  -0.013  0.67 
dummy  (0.025) (0.019) (0.032)   
War dummy  0.263  0.318  -0.055  0.42 
  (0.059) (0.034) (0.068)   
Change  in  war  0.036 0.011 0.025  0.71 
  (0.058) (0.034) (0.067)   
Log energy use per capita  -1.589  -1.740  0.152  0.69 
  (0.338) (0.180) (0.383)   
Log population  9.034  9.526  -0.492  0.05* 
  (0.219) (0.117) (0.248)   
Age of leader  55.172  52.777  2.395  0.14 
  (1.351) (0.866) (1.604)   
Tenure  of  leader  9.328 7.619 1.709  0.27 
  (1.440) (0.544) (1.539)   
Num obs  59  194     
       
Notes:  This table reports the means of each listed variable for successes and failures, where each observation is a serious attempt. 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values on differences in the mean are from two-sided unpaired t-tests. All variables are examined in 
the year before the attempt took place. Change variables represent the change from 3 years before the attempt occurred to one year 
before the attempt occurred.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy  dummy  0.068 0.063 0.071 0.070 
  (0.068) (0.066) (0.070) (0.067) 
Change in democracy   -0.039  -0.050  -0.033  -0.036 
dummy  (0.100) (0.103) (0.104) (0.109) 
War  dummy  0.057 0.063 0.061 0.067 
  (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.065) 
Change  in  war  -0.024 -0.017 -0.025 -0.013 
  (0.077) (0.083) (0.076) (0.083) 
Log energy use per capita  0.002  0.001  0.008  0.009 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log  population  -0.027 -0.025 -0.028 -0.032 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Age of leader  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure of leader  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Weapon  FE  NO YES  NO YES 
Region FE  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  208 208 208 208 
P-val of F-test on all listed 
variables 
0.46 0.49 0.46  0.40 
P-val of F-test on all listed 
variables and fixed effects  
0.46  0.06*  0.59  0.01*** 
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from a probit regression, where each observation is a serious attempt and the dependent 
variable equals 1 for successful assassinations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on country. Weapon FE 
refers to dummies for each weapon type (gun, knife, explosive, poison, other, unknown), and region FE refers to dummies for each 
region of the world (Africa, Asia, Middle East / North Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe / OECD). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     35
 
Table 4: Assassinations and Institutional Change 












next 20 years  
Panel A: Average effects     
Success  0.091 0.079 0.111 
 (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.057) 
Parm p-val  0.06*  0.12  0.06* 
Nonparm p-val  0.03**  0.02**  0.18 
Obs  221 221 138 
Data source  Polity IV  Polity IV  Archigos 
     
Panel B: Split by regime type in year before attempt   
Success × Autocracy   0.131  0.191 
   (0.055)  (0.085) 
Success × Democracy    -0.012 0.034 
    (0.083) (0.043) 
Autoc-Parm p    0.02**  0.03** 
Autoc-Nonparm p    0.01***  0.05** 
Democ-Parm p    0.89  0.43 
Democ-Nonparm p    0.13  0.96 
Obs   221 133 
Data source  Polity IV  Polity IV  Archigos 
Notes: Results from estimating equation (1). Success is a dummy for whether the assassination attempt succeeded.  The dependent 
variable in column (1) is a dummy for whether there was a change from autocracy to democracy or vice versa (change = 1, no change 
= 0).  The dependent variable in column (2) indicates the direction of any change (change to democracy = 1, no change = 0, change to 
autocracy = -1).  The dependent variable in column (3) is the percentage of future leader transitions that are “regular” as opposed to 
“irregular” (i.e. coups).  This measure excludes the transition of the leader in power during the attempt.  The sample in all columns is 
limited to serious attempts. Standard errors and parametric p-values are computed using robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering 
at the country level; these specifications all include dummies for weapon type and the number of attempts in that year. Non-parametric 
p-values are computed using Fisher’s exact (1935) p-values in columns (1) and (2) and using a Wilcoxon (1945) rank-sum test in 
column (3).  In Panel B, autocracy / democracy is defined by the POLITY2 dummy in the year before the attempt. The main effect for 
the lagged autocracy variable is also included in the Panel B regressions. Absolute change in POLITY2 dummy is not shown in Panel 
B as it is mechanically identical to the directional change in POLITY2 dummy once we split by lagged POLITY2 dummy status. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Tenure of leader and duration of effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All  leaders  Autocrats  only 
  All  Tenure <= 10  Tenure > 10  All  Tenure <= 10  Tenure > 10 
 
Panel A: Directional change in POLITY2 dummy 
1  year  out  0.079 0.058 0.129 0.130 0.088 0.214 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.125) (0.057) (0.069) (0.110) 
Parm  p-val 0.12 0.26 0.31 0.03**  0.21 0.06* 
Nonparm  p-val 0.02**  0.31  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.10*  0.01*** 
        
10  years  out 0.046 0.013 0.092 0.190 0.226 0.169 
  (0.062) (0.075) (0.146) (0.079) (0.108) (0.132) 
Parm  p-val 0.46 0.86 0.53 0.02**  0.04**  0.21 
Nonparm  p-val  0.01** 0.12  0.03** 0.05** 0.14  0.05** 
        
20  years  out -0.003  -0.006  0.001 0.023 0.091 0.013 
  (0.091) (0.116) (0.154) (0.090) (0.117) (0.157) 
Parm  p-val 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.80 0.44 0.94 
Nonparm  p-val  0.86 0.78 0.72 0.59 0.79 0.48 
        
Panel B: Percentage of transitions by ‘regular’ means 
1-10  years  out  0.099 0.126 0.087 0.186 0.197 0.102 
  (0.077) (0.089) (0.243) (0.113) (0.145) (0.255) 
Parm  p-val 0.21 0.16 0.73 0.11 0.18 0.70 
Nonparm  p-val  0.35 0.18 0.53 0.16 0.25 0.28 
        
1-20  years  out  0.111 0.116 0.274 0.165 0.147 0.306 
  (0.057) (0.063) (0.181) (0.095) (0.113) (0.227) 
Parm  p-val  0.06* 0.07* 0.15  0.09* 0.20  0.20 
Nonparm  p-val  0.18 0.23 0.03 0.05**  0.15 0.03** 
        
11-20  years  out  0.119 0.1  0.368 0.208 0.181 0.422 
  (0.068) (0.072) (0.246) (0.107) (0.110) (0.275) 
Parm  p-val 0.09*  0.17 0.16 0.06*  0.11 0.15 
Nonparm  p-val  0.25 0.59 0.04 0.03**  0.16 0.05** 
        
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient and p-values on “success” from a separate regression of equation (1). Columns (1) and (4) 
reports results for all leaders, columns (2) and (5) for those with tenure <= 10 years in year before assassination, and columns (3) and 
(6) for those with tenure > 10 years in year before year of attempt. For the POLITY2 dummy, 1 year out compares the change in polity 
score 1 year after attempt to 1 year before attempt; 5 years out compares the change in polity score 5 years after attempt to 1 year 
before attempt, etc. For regular transitions, 1-10 years out calculates the average percentage of leadership transitions that are regular in 
years 1-10 after the attempt; etc. Standard errors and p-values are as in Table 4.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Assassinations and Conflict: Change 1 Year After Attempt 
 
 










     
Panel A: Average effects     
Success  -0.072 0.041 0.162 
 (0.068)  (0.093)  (0.071) 
Parm  p-val  0.29 0.66 0.02** 
Nonparm p-val  0.57  0.83  0.03** 
Obs  223 116 116 
Data  source  Gleditsch Gleditsch PRIO 
     
Panel B: Split by war status  in year before attempt 
Success × Intense War  -0.255 -0.103 -0.110 
  (0.144) (0.257) (0.294) 
Success × Moderate War     0.334 
     (0.163) 
Success × Not At War  -0.024  0.020  0.070 
 (0.068)  (0.086)  (0.057) 
Intense War-Parm p  0.08*  0.69  0.71 
Intense War-Nonparm p  0.13  1.00  0.69 
Moderate War-Parm p  N/A  N/A  0.05** 
Moderate War-Nonparm p  N/A  N/A  0.13 
Not At War-Parm p  0.73  0.82  0.22 
Not At War –Nonparm p  0.62  0.71  0.21 
Obs  222 116 116 
Data  source  Gleditsch Gleditsch PRIO 
     
Notes: See notes to Table 4. Non-parametric p-values are computed using Fisher’s exact tests.  In Panel B, at war / not at war is 
defined by whether the relevant war concept (i.e., the concept used in the dependent variable) is positive in the year before the attempt. 
The main effect for the lagged war variable is also included in the regression in Panel B. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%   38
 
 
Table 7: Alternative specifications 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Absolute change in 
POLITY2 dummy 
1 year out 
Directional change in POLITY2 
dummy 1 year out 
Percentage regular leader 
transitions 1-20 years out 
  All  All  Autocrats only  All  Autocrats only 
Baseline specification  0.091  0.079 0.131 0.111 0.191 
(Serious attempts)  (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.085) 
Parm p-val  0.06*  0.12  0.02**  0.06*  0.03** 
Nonparm p-val  0.03**  0.02**  0.01***  0.18  0.05** 
Obs  221  221 142 138  74 
        
Control group: Bystanders   0.078  0.076 0.130 0.151 0.255 
Or target wounded  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.074)  (0.097) 
Parm p-val  0.11  0.15  0.02**  0.05**  0.01*** 
Nonparm p-val  0.07*  0.06*  0.02**  0.13  0.01*** 
Obs 157  157  103  97  54 
        
Control group: Target   0.081  0.057 0.120 0.182 0.264 
Wounded (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.095)  (0.126) 
Parm p-val  0.11  0.28  0.03**  0.06*  0.04** 
Nonparm p-val  0.11  0.25  0.12  0.35  0.04** 
Obs 104  104  66  68  38 
        
Control group: Any attempt  0.090  0.068 0.132 0.116 0.172 
  (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.081) 
Parm p-val  0.06*  0.18  0.02**  0.04**  0.04** 
Nonparm p-val  0.02**  0.01***  0.01***  0.37  0.10* 
Obs  260  260 166 173  94 
        
Solo attempts only  0.073  0.027 0.095 0.144 0.258 
  (0.063)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.115) 
Parm p-val  0.25  0.68 0.15 0.02**  0.03** 
Nonparm p-val  0.26  0.41 0.21 0.41 0.11 
Obs  100 100  53  65  30 
        
First attempt on leader   0.080  0.048 0.099 0.111 0.206 
Serious attempts only  (0.060)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.061)  (0.093) 
Parm  p-val  0.18  0.47 0.14 0.07*  0.03** 
Nonparm p-val  0.12  0.11  0.07*  0.41  0.11 
Obs  172  172 102 108  52 
        
Adding all Table 3 controls 
quarter-century FE , and  
0.081  0.088 0.176 0.192 0.237 
region FE (Serious attempts)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.084)  (0.063)  (0.110) 
Parm p-val  0.15  0.13  0.04**  0.00***  0.04** 
Obs  189  189 115 112  57 
        
Notes: See text.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   39
 
Table 8: What predicts attempts? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Democracy  dummy  -0.007*        -0.001 
  (0.004)        (0.003) 
War  dummy    0.028***       0.018*** 
    (0.006)       (0.006) 
Log energy use per       -0.003***        -0.002*** 
Capita     (0.001)      (0.001) 
Log  population      0.005***     0.005*** 
      (0.001)     (0.001) 
Age  of  leader       -0.00022*    -0.00030** 
       (0.00012)    (0.00015) 
Tenure of leader        -0.00011  -0.00010 
        (0.00020)  (0.00024) 
Observations  11171 11671 9664  10607 12019 12133 9185 
P-value of regression  0.08*  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.08*  0.60  0.00*** 
         
Notes: Results are marginal effects from a probit specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the 
country level.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Separating Impacts of Successes and Failures on Institutional Change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Absolute change in POLITY2 dummy  Directional change in POLITY2 dummy  Percent regular leader transitions 1-20 years out 





















Panel A: Average effects  
Success  0.098 0.101 0.099 0.066 0.062 0.064 0.071 0.110 0.105 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) 
Failure 0.006  0.005  0.004  -0.017  -0.019  -0.020  -0.071  -0.043  -0.045 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Success p-val  0.02**  0.02** 0.02** 0.17  0.16 0.15 0.08* 0.01***  0.02** 
Failure p-val  0.72  0.77  0.79  0.39  0.31  0.31  0.08*  0.09*  0.08* 
Obs  10932 10932 10932 10932 10932 10932 5979  5979  5979 
Data source  Polity IV  Polity IV  Polity IV  Polity IV  Polity IV  Polity IV  Archigos  Archigos  Archigos 
           
Panel B: Split by regime type in year before attempt 
Success  × Autocracy  .  .  .  0.125 0.127 0.127 0.155 0.210 0.208 
  .  .  .  (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) 
Failure × Autocracy  .  .  .  -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 -0.074 -0.062 -0.060 
  .  .  .  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.052) (0.041)  (0.042) 
Success  × Democracy  . . .  -0.051  -0.048  -0.045  0.023  0.003  -0.004 
 .  .  .  (0.066)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Failure × Democracy  . . .  -0.042  -0.040  -0.039  -0.025  -0.023  -0.028 
 .  .  .  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Autoc  P-val–  Success  .  .  .  0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01***  0.00***  0.00*** 
Autoc  P-val–  Failure  .  .  .  0.42 0.62 0.57 0.16 0.14  0.15 
Democ P-val– Success  .  .  .  0.44  0.45  0.48  0.50  0.94  0.93 
Democ P-val– Failure  .  .  .  0.32  0.33  0.35  0.51  0.48  0.39 
Obs        10932 10932 10932 5573  5573  5573 
Data source        Polity IV  Polity IV  Polity IV  Archigos  Archigos  Archigos 
           
Notes: Controls includes lagged values of polity, leader’s tenure, war status, population, and energy; quarter-century fixed effects; and region fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  41
 
Table 10: Separating Impacts of Successes and Failures on Conflict 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 



























Panel A: Average effects  
Success  -0.069  -0.020  -0.024 0.035 0.027 0.027 0.080 0.078 0.077 
  (0.060) (0.049) (0.049) (0.075) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) 
Failure 0.001  0.058  0.057  -0.022  0.006  0.007  -0.056  -0.044  -0.044 
 (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Success p-val  0.25  0.69 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Failure p-val  0.98  0.11  0.11  0.65  0.88  0.87  0.13  0.25  0.24 
Obs  11286  11286  11286  7183 7183 7183 7183 7183 7183 
Data source  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  PRIO PRIO PRIO 
           
Panel B: Split by war status  in year before attempt 
Success  × Intense war  -0.248 -0.251 -0.263 -0.095 -0.096 -0.103 -0.044 -0.059 -0.063 
  (0.125) (0.123) (0.122) (0.219) (0.222) (0.214) (0.272) (0.290) (0.287) 
Failure × Intense war  0.006 0.000 0.000  -0.042  -0.048  -0.048 0.059 0.061 0.060 
  (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) 
Success  × Moderate war         0.208  0.199  0.199 
         ( 0 . 1 3 7 )   (0.142)  (0.142) 
Failure × Moderate war         - 0 . 0 9 1   -0.104  -0.103 
         ( 0 . 0 7 4 )   (0.068)  (0.069) 
Success  × Not at war  0.066 0.062 0.060 0.074  0.052  0.052  0.070  0.054  0.055 
 (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Failure × Not at war  0.104  0.084  0.081  0.049  0.026  0.027  0.036  0.015  0.016 
 (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Intense  war  P-val  –  Success  0.05**  0.04**  0.03**  0.67 0.67 0.63 0.87 0.84 0.83 
Intense  war  P-val–  Failure  0.93 1.00 0.99 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.41 0.41 
Moderate  war  P-val–Success         0.13  0.16  0.16 
Moderate  war  P-val–  Failure         0.22  0.13  0.14 
No war P-val– Success  0.20  0.21  0.23  0.27  0.43  0.42  0.21  0.32  0.31 
No war P-val– Failure  0.02**  0.05**  0.05**  0.23  0.54  0.52  0.32  0.68  0.64 
Obs  11286  11286  11286  7183 7183 7183 7183 7183 7183 
Data source  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  Gleditsch  PRIO PRIO PRIO 
           
Notes: Controls includes lagged values of polity, leader’s tenure, war status, population, and energy; quarter-century fixed effects; and region fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1:  Trends in the Frequency of Assassinations and Assassination Attempts 
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